

19 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bross

SUBJECT: Authorities and Responsibilities of DIA

1. A perusal of the basic DOD Directive setting up the DIA reveals some interesting points. This is No. 5105.21, originally dated August 1, 1961, and brought up-to-date through September 1, 1963. There are about four other directives which evidently identify DOD elements which are excluded from this directive (as is NSA). [redacted] is running these down but presumably they will not cast any further light on the subject of this memorandum.

2. Among the key provisions are the following:

a. The chain of command runs from SecDef through the JCS to the Director of DIA. Guidance to the Director, DIA, is to be furnished by: SecDef; JCS, acting under the authority and direction of SecDef; and USIB. (II. C.)

Comment: I think the general impression around is that the Director of DIA has two hats, one a Defense hat and the other a JCS one. It appears that strictly speaking this is not actually the case. Of course in actual practice the distinction between command and guidance, in the case of the JCS, would tend to get pretty blurred and would result effectively in the two-hat situation.

b. The DIA is responsible for review and coordination of the intelligence functions retained by the military departments. Over-all guidance for conduct and management of such functions is to be developed by the Director of DIA for review, approval and promulgation by the Secretary of Defense. (III. E.)

c. DIA is responsible for supervision of the execution of all approved plans, programs, policies and procedures for intelligence functions not assigned to DIA. (III. C.)

Comment: I suspect that there is a good deal of unevenness in the manner in which this is applied.

d. Also on the management side, DIA is responsible for obtaining the maximum economy and efficiency in the allocation and management of DOD intelligence resources. This is to include analysis of these DOD activities and facilities which can be fully integrated or co-located with non-DOD intelligence organizations. (III. D.)

✓ Comment: No doubt we will find that Fubini's operations and the SMAC set-up are specifically excluded from this directive, when we see the full package. If this is not the case, however, it raises some interesting questions about the Fubini position in the FMSAC squabble.

e. DIA is responsible for satisfying the intelligence requirements of the major components of DOD (III. F). It shall provide intelligence staff support as directed to the JCS (IV. I.). It shall provide military intelligence to: SecDef, the military departments, the JCS, specialized DOD agencies, unified and specified commands, and other organizations in the national intelligence community (IV. J.).

Comment: These provisions also undoubtedly have the effect of blurring the relationship to SecDef and to the JCS.

f. The DIA shall develop DOD intelligence research and development requirements (IV. K.).


Comment: This would seem to have a direct bearing on Carroll's apparently successful battle to be the element to stay on top of R&D in the audio and counter-audio fields.

3. Apropos the LCI's discussion with Fabini on the organizational concepts which would affect the possible establishment of an Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, I would conclude that the provisions of this directive, strictly interpreted, would not put such an individual in between the Chairmans of the JCS and the Director of the DIA. This would not be true any more nor less than such an official would find himself in between SecDef and the Chairman. Of course all of this is pretty legalistic and, as noted a couple of times above, the actual working of the mechanism might not be quite so clear-cut.

(Signed) Thomas A. Parrott

TAP

cc:



Mr. Lay

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